NATO Counterterrorism and Article 5:  Hammer of the North Atlantic or Paper Tiger? by Ayliffe, David D
NATO COUNTERTERRORISM AND ARTICLE 5:  HAMMER OF THE NORTH 
ATLANTIC OR PAPER TIGER? 
 
DAVID AYLIFFE*
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  Formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 1. The Soviet Menace 
 2. The Response of the West:  The Advent of Collective Defense 
 a. The American Response 
 i.  The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 
 b. The European Response 
 i.  The Brussels Treaty 
 c.  The Unification of Trans-Atlantic Collective Defense 
 
III. ARTICLE 5  
IV.  NATO COUNTERTERRORISM 
A.  NATO’S Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism 
 B.  NATO Response Force 
 
V.  THE PROPRIETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO’S COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM UNDER     
ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
A.  Article 5 & Terrorist Attacks on NATO Nations 
 B.  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 
VI. CONCLUSION 
2I. INTRODUCTION 
In November 2002, leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assembled for 
their annual summit in Prague, Czech Republic.1 This, however, was no ordinary summit.  The 
meeting was billed as a “transformation Summit,”2 and it provided an opportunity for NATO to 
announce a series of important changes designed to maximize NATO’s twenty-first century 
military effectiveness and to reiterate NATO’s resolve to combat terrorism.3 Then NATO 
Secretary-General Lord Robertson commented that the Prague Summit “is not business as usual, 
but the emergence of a new and modernised NATO, fit for the challenges of the new century.”4
Additionally, the occasion prompted President Bush to remark that, “[a]t the [Prague] summit, 
we'll make the most significant reforms in NATO since 1949— reforms which will allow our 
Alliance to effectively confront new dangers.”5 With the Prague Summit leaders unequivocally 
 
1 NATO Update November 2002 at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/11-
november/e1121e.htm (Nov. 21, 2002).   
 
2 NATO Speech, Prague Summit Press Conference at
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021120g.htm (Nov. 20, 2002).    
 
3 NATO Update November 2002 at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/11-
november/e1121e.htm (Nov. 21, 2002). In addition to the military restructuring, the Prague 
Summit provided a forum for the announcement of the accession of seven, new member states to 
NATO:  Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  Id. These 
countries officially joined NATO on March 29, 2004.  NATO Topics, Enlargement at
http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.html (last updated Feb. 18, 2005).  NATO also 
issued a joint statement on the then-ongoing, pre-invasion Iraq debate. NATO Update November 
2002 at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/11-november/e1121e.htm (Nov. 21, 2002).  
4 NATO Speech, Press Statement by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General 
following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and 
Government at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021121n.htm (Nov. 21, 2002). 
5 NATO Speech, Remarks by the President of the United States, George W. Bush 
to the Atlantic Student Summit at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021120f.htm (Nov. 20, 
2002). 
3committed to “transforming” and “reforming” NATO to confront the “new dangers” and 
“challenges of the new century,” the NATO leaders were just as explicit in identifying 
international terrorism as NATO’s principal twenty-first century security threat.6
6 NATO Press Release, Prague Summit Declaration at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm (Nov. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Prague 
Declaration].  The Prague Declaration was the NATO Heads of State’s official press release, and 
several pertinent portions of the Prague Declaration underscore the central role counterterrorism 
is playing in NATO’ strategic thinking: 
 
1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North 
Atlantic Alliance, met today to enlarge our Alliance and further strengthen 
NATO to meet the grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 
21st century.  
2.  Recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent 
decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, we have approved a 
comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO’s Strategic Concept, to 
strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, 
populations and territory, from wherever they may come. Today's decisions 
will provide for balanced and effective capabilities within the Alliance so that 
NATO can better carry out the full range of its missions and respond 
collectively to those challenges, including the threat posed by terrorism and 
by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery. 
 
. . . .
4.  We underscore that our efforts to transform and adapt NATO should not be 
perceived as a threat by any country or organisation, but rather as a 
demonstration of our determination to protect our populations, territory and 
forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad. 
 
. . . .
e. Endorse the agreed military concept for defence against 
terrorism. The concept is part of a package of measures to 
strengthen NATO’s capabilities in this area, which also 
includes improved intelligence sharing and crisis response 
arrangements. Terrorism, which we categorically reject and 
condemn in all its forms and manifestations, poses a grave and 
growing threat to Alliance populations, forces and territory, as 
well as to international security. We are determined to combat 
this scourge for as long as necessary. To combat terrorism 
4Reflecting back upon the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO’s strident anti-terrorism rhetoric 
hardly seems shocking.  The Prague Summit occurred just one year after NATO, for the first 
time in its history,7 invoked Article 58 of the North Atlantic Treaty.9 NATO’s invocation of 
 
effectively, our response must be multi-faceted and 
comprehensive. We are committed, in cooperation with our 
partners, to fully implement the Civil Emergency Planning 
(CEP) Action Plan for the improvement of civil preparedness 
against possible attacks against the civilian population with 
chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) agents. We will 
enhance our ability to provide support, when requested, to help 
national authorities to deal with the consequences of terrorist 
attacks, including attacks with CBRN against critical 
infrastructure, as foreseen in the CEP Action Plan. 
 
. . . .
7. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) have greatly enhanced security and stability throughout the Euro-
Atlantic area. . . . We welcome the resolve of Partners to undertake all efforts 
to combat terrorism, including through the Partnership Action Plan against 
Terrorism.
8. We welcome the significant achievements of the NATO-Russia Council since 
the historic NATO-Russia Summit meeting in Rome. . . .  NATO member 
states and Russia are working together in the NATO-Russia Council as equal 
partners, making progress in areas such as . . . the struggle against terrorism . .
. .
10. We reaffirm that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability 
in the Mediterranean. We therefore decide to upgrade substantially the 
political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue as an 
integral part of the Alliance’s cooperative approach to security. In this respect, 
we encourage intensified practical cooperation and effective interaction on 
security matters of common concern, including terrorism-related issues, as 
appropriate, where NATO can provide added value. 
Id. (emphasis added).   
7 CNN.com, NATO: U.S. evidence 'compelling’ at 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/02/inv.nato.if/ (October 2, 2001). 
8 The text of Article 5 reads as follows:   
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
5Article 5 was in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington, D.C. (September 11th Terrorist Attacks).10 As embodied in the Prague 
Declaration,11 NATO’s swift and serious response to the grave danger posed by international 
terrorism can certainly be described as both pragmatic and proactive.  Yet, what remains unclear 
is how well NATO’s counterterrorism12 programme conforms to the spirit of the North Atlantic 
 
right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken 
as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. 
North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246 available 
at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. 
9 NATO Topics, NATO’s contribution to the fight against terrorism at
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2005).   
10 Id. NATO invoked Article 5 after United States’ investigations confirmed that 
the world-wide terrorist network headed by Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, was responsible for the 
September 11th Terrorist Attacks.  Id. NATO’s invocation of Article 5 came just twenty days 
after the North Atlantic Council meetings in which “[t]he Council agreed that if it is determined 
that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an 
action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty . . . .”  
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm.  See also CNN.com, NATO: U.S. evidence 
'compelling’ at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/02/inv.nato.if/ (October 2, 
2001).  
11 See Prague Declaration, supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 
12 NATO defines counterterrorism as “offensive military action designed to reduce 
terrorists’ capabilities.” NATO Issues, NATO’s military Concept For Defence Against Terrorism 
at http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm (last updated Apr., 14, 2005).  Similarly, the 
United States Department of Defense defines counterterrorism as “[o]perations that include the 
offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.”  DOD Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms, at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/c/01366.html 
(last visited June 1, 2005).    
 
6Treaty, in particular Article 5?13 This question becomes even more compelling when one 
considers that the 2002 Prague Summit also provided the occasion for the formal unveiling of 
NATO’s newest weapon for twenty-first century combat operations:  The NATO Response 
Force (NRF)14 —a unit which NATO planners intend to have worldwide deployment capability15 
13 Some commentators have suggested that NATO’s organizational structure, as 
devised in the North Atlantic Treaty, ill equips NATO for counterterrorism operations.  See 
Michael M. Gallagher, Comment, Declaring Victory And Getting Out [Of Europe]:  Why The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Should Disband, 25 Hous. J. Int’l L. 341, 359 (2003) 
(opining that “NATO cannot contribute much to the fight against international terrorism.”); 
Michael A. Goldberg, Note, Mirage Of Defense:  Reexamining Article Five Of The North 
Atlantic Treaty After The Terrorist Attacks On The United States, 26 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 
77 (2003); Broderick C. Grady, Note, Article 5 Of The North Atlantic Treaty: Past, Present, And 
Uncertain Future, Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 167, 198 (2002) (asserting that “NATO should realize 
that Article 5 is simply not an effective tool for countering terrorism.”).    
 
14 Prague Declaration, supra note 7.  Paragraph 4(a) of the Prague declaration states 
that NATO has decided to:   
Create a NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a 
technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and 
sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to 
move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council. The 
NRF will also be a catalyst for focusing and promoting 
improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities. We gave 
directions for the development of a comprehensive concept for 
such a force, which will have its initial operational capability as 
soon as possible, but not later than October 2004 and its full 
operational capability not later than October 2006, and for a report 
to Defence Ministers in Spring 2003. The NRF and the related 
work of the EU Headline Goal should be mutually reinforcing 
while respecting the autonomy of both organisations. 
Id. (emphasis added).  On October 13, 2004, NATO announced that the Response 
Force had reached initial operational capability.  NATO Update, Response Force 
ready for missions at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/10-
october/e1013a.htm (Oct. 13, 2004).  The NRF forms an integral part of NATO’s 
transformation agenda.  NATO Topics, The NATO Response Force at
http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2005); see supra 
notes 5–6.        
 
15 SHAPE Issues, The NATO Response Force—NRF:  Role at
http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfb.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2003).  SHAPE is 
7and which has been expressly earmarked for counterterrorism operations.16 Thus, two questions 
must be addressed:  1.) whether this aggressive, global operations capable counterterrorism 
programme is consistent with NATO’s historic role as a collective defense organization, and 2.)  
whether Article 5 is an effective mechanism for authorizing and employing NATO’s 
counterterrorism assets?    
In order to answer these questions, Part II of this article will provide a detailed discussion 
of NATO’s history and an analysis of the motivations which led to the formation of the alliance.   
Part III offers an examination of Article 5, the North Atlantic Treaty’s collective defense 
provision.  Part IV seeks to provide a detailed analysis of NATO’s counterterrorism programme, 
with particular emphasis on the new NATO Response Force.  Finally, Part V asserts, and 
ultimately concludes, that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is sufficiently flexible to 
encompass NATO’s counterterrorism programme and that NATO’s counterterrorism programme 
is consistent with NATO’s historical role as a collective defense organization.   
 
the acronym for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.  SHAPE Information, Overview 
at http://www.nato.int/shape/about/overview.htm (last updated Sept. 16 2004).       
 
16 SHAPE Issues, The NATO Response Force—NRF:  Role at
http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfb.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2003); see NATO 
Issues, NATO’s military Concept For Defence Against Terrorism at
http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm (last updated Apr., 14, 2005).  In addition to 
counterterrorism, NATO has manifested its desire to utilize the NRF for a variety of potential 
missions:  conflict prevention, non-combatant evacuation operations, crisis response, 
humanitarian, peacekeeping, and embargo operations.  SHAPE Issues, The NATO Response 
Force—NRF:  Role at http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfb.htm (last updated Sept. 
26, 2003). 
 
8II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization17 
1.  The Soviet Menace 
 
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended 
across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, 
Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around 
them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or 
another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases 
increasing measure of control from Moscow.18 
Less than a year after the end of World War Two in Europe, Sir Winston Churchill uttered these, 
now famous lines, prophetically perceiving that the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to 
post-war global stability and peace.   
Still, many in the West did not possess Churchill’s perspicacity and either refused to 
accept or were unable to recognize the threat posed by Soviet foreign policy and ideological 
 
17 This author seeks to avoid the mistakes of other commentators who too frequently 
engage in cursory historical examination and offer the prosaic version of the reasons for the 
formation of NATO:  the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West deteriorated; thus, 
NATO was formed.  While technically correct on the most basic, macro level, proceeding from 
such an oversimplified premise often leads to the mistaken conclusion that NATO was formed 
for the sole purpose of defending against the threat posed by the Soviet Union, which, in turn, 
leads to the equally mistaken conclusion that NATO has lost its relevance now that the sole 
reason for its existence has disappeared.  Therefore, this author seeks to provide an in-depth 
historical analysis of the reasons behind NATO’s formation in order to demonstrate that NATO 
was created to combat any threat to the security of the North Atlantic area.    
 
18 Sir Winston Churchill, Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain), Speech Delivered at 
Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri (Mar. 5, 1946), at
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=429 (last visited June 1, 2005). 
Some scholars have referred to Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech as the informal declaration of the 
Cold War.  See Walter La Feber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1975 39 (New York:  
John Wiley and Sons) (1976); Timothy P. Ireland, Creating The Entangling Alliance–The 
Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 19 (Greenwood Press) (1981).     
 
9objectives.19 The Western allies, weary from six years of war, were anxious to demobilize and 
begin the task of rebuilding Europe.20 Moreover, the signing of the United Nations Charter on 
June 26, 1945 prompted many to conclude that the framework for the peaceful resolution of all 
future disputes had been firmly established.21 Yet, the West’s nascent, post-war optimism proved 
short- lived as the course of world events exposed that optimism as an idyllic delusion.  
Perhaps the fog of war had clouded the judgment of the Western allies vis a vis the Soviet 
Union; however, the Kremlin’s Machiavellian predisposition had been on display long before the 
guns of the Second World War fell silent.22 By the end of the war, Soviet territorial expansion 
 
19 See Lord Ismay, NATO:  The First Five Years 1949–1954 4 (1955); see also 
Prince Hubertus zu Löwenstein & Volkmar von Zühlsdorff, NATO AND THE DEFENSE OF THE
WEST 41 (Andre Deutsch LTD 1963) (1960) (observing that the Soviet Union was unwilling to 
halt the spread of the world communist revolution for the sake of treaty obligations). 
20 Ismay, supra note 18, at 4.  On May 8, 1945 (VE Day), the United States had 3, 
100,000 men in Europe, and, one year later, that number was 391,000.  Id. Similarly, Great 
Britain had 1,321,000 men in continental Europe on VE Day and only 488,000 one year later.  
Id. Canadian armed strength in Europe amounted to 299,000 men on the day of Germany’s 
surrender and, in less than a year, they had all returned to Canada.  Id.
21 Ismay, supra note 18, at 3–4; zu Löwenstein & von Zühlsdorff, supra note 19, at 
40.  In his book, Lord Ismay noted that  
[t]he Charter was founded on two assumptions.  First, that the five 
Powers holding permanent seats in the Security Council – China, 
France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet 
Union – would be able to reach lasting agreement on major 
matters.  Secondly, that apart from Russia’s known claims on 
Japan, none of these Powers sought any territorial aggrandizement.  
Unfortunately, neither of these assumptions proved correct. 
Isamy, supra note 18, at 3.    
 
22 Pursuant to the secret protocols of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 
1939, the Germans and Soviets agreed to divide Poland, with the U.S.S.R. occupying the eastern 
half of the country.  zu Löwenstein & von Zühlsdorff, supra note 19, at 43.  The secret protocols 
of the Non-Aggression Pact also gave the Soviet Union free reign over the Baltic states, and, by 
war’s end, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were incorporated into the U.S.S.R.  Id. Additionally, 
the Soviet Union used the war to annex Karelia from Finland, East Prussia from Germany, 
Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia, and Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Romania.  Id.
10
had extended to include an additional 124,000 square miles and 23,000,000 people.23 During the 
immediate post-war period, Moscow continued to expand its hegemony.  After “liberating” 
Eastern Europe from the Nazis, the Soviet Union, through a combination of political terror24 and 
the overwhelming strength of the occupying Red Army, brought Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania under Soviet domination.25 
In Asia, the Soviets attempted to detach southern Azerbaijan from Iran26 and occupied 
Manchuria and the northern Korean peninsula.27 The Soviet Union also used its power and 
influence in the Far East to enable Mao Zedong and his communist forces to take power in China 
and to establish a communist republic in North Korea.28 In addition to their naked aggression 
and sponsorship of a growing number of communist regimes, the Soviet Union did not 
demobilize and disarm its military after World War Two; instead, the Red Army, numbering 
over 4,000,000 men, remained in the field, and the Soviet armaments industry continued 
 
23 Id. at 43–44.  Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, 
Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian statesman and second NATO Secretary-General, declared that “[o]nly 
one power emerged from the war with additional territory, and that power is the Soviet Union.” 
Id. at 44.     
 
24 Id. at 44.  With Moscow’s support, communists murdered, imprisoned, and exiled 
opposition leaders in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Romania.  Id.
25 Ismay, supra note 18, at 5.   
 
26 zu Löwenstein & von Zühlsdorff, supra note 19, at 46.   
 
27 Ismay, supra note 18, at 6.   
 
28 zu Löwenstein & von Zühlsdorff, supra note 19, at 46.  Additionally, Soviet 
sponsorship of communist agitation in Asia also helped create an ideal environment for 
communist insurrections throughout Indochina.  Id.
11
producing at maximum capacity.29 These developments would prove to be harbingers of 
discord among the war-time allies.    
The rift between the Soviet Union and the West began developing shortly before the 
close of hostilities in the Second World War.  One of the first disagreements came at the San 
Francisco Conference of 1945 when Poland was prevented from participating because the Soviet 
Union and the Western Powers could not agree upon the composition of Poland’s provisional 
government.30 The following autumn in London,31 Soviet inflexibility and obstruction 
temporarily paralyzed the Council of Foreign Ministers’32 preparations for peace treaty 
negotiations with the lesser World War Two adversaries.33 In a Soviet radio address four months 
later, Stalin announced that “armed conflict remained an inherent part of the western capitalist 
 
29 Ismay, supra note 18, at 4; zu Löwenstein & von Zühlsdorff, supra note 19, at 
41–42. 
 
30 Ismay, supra not 18, at 4.   
31 See Report on First Session Of The Council Of Foreign Ministers, London, 
September 11–October 2, 1945, Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1945 at 507–12 
[hereinafter 1945 London Council of Foreign Ministers Report] available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade18.htm;  Isamy, supra not 18, at 4. Secretary 
Byrnes’ report details the inflexible and obstinate behavior exhibited by the Soviet delegation at 
the London Conference.  1945 London Council of Foreign Ministers Report.  
32 At the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the United States, United Kingdom, and the 
Soviet Union agreed to create a Council of Foreign Ministers whose task was to make the 
necessary preparations for the peace settlements.   PROTOCOL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
BERLIN CONFERENCE, Article I, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1945, vol.2, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), at 1478 [hereinafter Potsdam 
Protocol] available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm.  The Council 
was to be comprised of the foreign ministers from the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet 
Union, France, and China.  Id.
33 Ismay, supra not 18, at 4–5.  The Paris Peace Treaties were signed with Italy, 
Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania on February 10, 1947.  Id. at 5.   
 
12
system and that future wars could be expected.”34 Soviet diplomatic intransigence persisted at 
the March 1947 Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in Moscow where the Council faced 
serious disagreements concerning the future of Germany.35 At the Council meeting seven 
months later in London, the Soviets remained intractable and, again, the Council was deadlocked 
on the many questions regarding the future of Germany.36 On March 28, 1948, the Soviet 
delegation quit the Allied Control Council in Berlin.37 Three days later, the deterioration of the 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the West culminated in the Soviet blockade of 
Berlin.38  Not only did the Berlin crisis of 1948 cement the schism between the World War Two 
 
34 Ireland supra note18.   
35 Ismay, supra not 18, at 4–5.  In Moscow, the Soviets and the Western ministers 
disagreed over the structure of the future German government, the structure of the German 
economy, the amount of reparations owed by Germany, the demarcation of the boundary 
between Germany and Poland, the procedure for drafting the German peace treaty, the Four 
Power Pact proposal, and the Austrian peace treaty.  Moscow Meeting Of The Council of 
Foreign Ministers, March 10–April 24, 1947, Address By Secretary of State General George C. 
Marshall, Department of State Bulletin, May 11, 1947 at 919–24[hereinafter 1947 Moscow 
Council of Foreign Ministers Report] available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade23.htm; see also Ireland supra note 18, at 22–
23 (discussing the unsuccessful results of the Moscow Conference).    
 
36 Ismay, supra note 18, at 5. 
 
37 Id. The Allied Control Council was established at the Potsdam Conference and 
functioned as the post-war, military government of Germany.  Potsdam Protocol, supra note 31, 
at Article II.  The headquarters of the Allied Control Council was in Berlin, and from there the 
military governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union 
administered their respective zones of occupation.  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_Control_Council.  It was this headquarters building in Berlin 
that the Soviets vacated on March 28, 1948, and the American, British, and French military 
legations departed shortly thereafter.  Id.
38 See zu Löwenstein & von Zühlsdorff, supra note 19, at 54.  The Soviet Blockade 
of Berlin lasted for 323 days but was defeated by the courage demonstrated by the Western 
Allies—the United States, Great Britain, and France—in undertaking the famous Berlin Airlift.  
Ismay, supra note 18, at 9.  
 
13
allies, but Berlin itself symbolized the division of the world into two armed camps and, for forty-
one years, was the epicenter of suspicion and enmity between East and West.  
2. The Response of the West:  The Advent of Collective Defense 
 Although the war-weary nations of the West initially balked at the prospect of 
confronting their increasingly belligerent former ally,39 Soviet bellicosity engendered a rapid 
change of attitude among the Western allies.  Thus, it was principally40 the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union that would cause the United States, which led the way, and the nations of western 
Europe to conclude that the best guarantee of their future security lay in mutual assistance and 
cooperation with one another —a policy of collective defense that would ultimately result in the 
formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.   
 
39 See Ismay, supra note 18 for a discussion of the West’s reluctance to counter the 
Soviet Union’s aggressive foreign policy during the immediate post-war period.   
 
40 Ismay, supra note 18, at 3. Lord Ismay observed that “[t]he history of the 
immediate post-war period is largely that of how the Kremlin, aided by exceptionally favourable 
circumstances, used the combined strength of the Red Army and world Communism to carry 
forward expansionist policies, and of how the rest of the world reacted.” Id. See Ireland supra 
note 18.  Ireland’s book explores the multiple, historical motivations which culminated in the 
creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but acknowledges that NATO was formed, 
primarily, as a counterpoise against the Soviet military presence in Europe.  Id. See also NATO 
Handbook, The Origins of the Alliance, available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0101.htm (identifying the threat of Soviet 
aggression the resulting need for a bulwark to defend against that threat as the principal reason 
for the formation of the Alliance).  Cf. John J. McCloy, The Atlantic Alliance:  its origin and its 
future 23–25 (Carnegie Mellon University 1969).  McCloy commented that the principal reason 
for the formation of the alliance was not the threat of Soviet military aggression but rather the 
ideological threat posed by the Soviet desire to bring the militarily and economically weakened 
areas of Western Europe under communist hegemony.  Id.
14
a.   The American Response 
 American discontent with the Soviets manifested itself on the diplomatic front as early as 
1945.41 At the London conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the autumn of 1945, 
Secretary of State James Byrnes reported that the Americans and Soviets had disagreed sharply 
over the nature of decisions made the previous summer at the Potsdam conference.42 In early 
1946, shortly after Stalin’s February 1946 radio address in which he announced that warfare 
between capitalist and communist societies was inevitable,43 George F. Keenan, the American 
charge d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, sent his famous “Long Telegram”44 wherein 
he “presented a dark picture of the motivations behind Soviet foreign policy”45 and 
recommended a policy of containment that would guide the United States’ Soviet policy for 
almost fifty years.46 The diplomatic situation continued to deteriorate throughout 1946.  At the 
Paris Foreign Ministers Conference held in the spring of 1946, lack of cooperation between the 
Soviets and the Western Allies—the United States, Great Britain, and France—over the 
administration of occupied Germany caused Secretary of State Byrnes to suggest a four-power 
 
41 Ismay, supra not 18, at  4. 
 
42 See 1945 London Council of Foreign Ministers Report, supra note 30; Potsdam 
Protocol, supra note 31.   
 
43 See supra note 33.  
 
44 The cable was referred to as the “Long Telegram” because it contained over 8,000 
words of detailed, comprehensive analysis on the historical underpinnings of and projections for 
the likely course of Soviet foreign policy. available at 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/02/documents/kennan/. 
 
45 Ireland supra note 18.   
 
46 Id. at 19–28.  
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treaty solution to the German problem.47 The Soviets, initially non-committal, formally rejected 
the proposal two months later.48 The relationship continued to worsen in 1947.  In an address to 
Congress on March, 12, 1947, President Truman announced the future course of American 
foreign policy—American commitment to a policy of containment of totalitarianism and Soviet 
communism—which became known as the Truman Doctrine.49 Unsurprisingly, the Moscow 
Council of Foreign Ministers Conference, which had begun two days earlier,50 ended in failure as 
 
47 Ireland, supra note 18.  
 
48 Id. at 20.  The principal reason for the rejection of the proposal was the Soviet 
demand that reparations shipments be completed before making long-term decisions on 
Germany’s future.  Id. at 19–21. 
 
49 President Harry S. Truman’s Address Before A Joint Session Of Congress, March 
12, 1947 available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm [hereinafter Truman 
Doctrine Address].  Truman’s speech was precipitated by political developments in the eastern 
Mediterranean.  Ireland, supra note 18, at 23–29.  In February of 1947, the British government 
informed the United States that financial considerations compelled the United Kingdom to cease 
its provision of assistance to the Greek monarchy in its struggle against Communist rebels and to 
the Turkish government’s attempts to withstand Soviet political coercion.  Id. at 23–24.  Truman 
proclaimed “that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” and that the United 
States should do its utmost to aid Greece and Turkey in their efforts to resist communist 
subversion, and, thus, he requested that Congress authorize both economic and military aid.  
Truman Doctrine Address, supra. Although not specifically mentioning them, the intended 
recipient of Truman’s declaration was clearly the Soviet Union, and the speech represented an 
unmistakable warning to the Soviets that, henceforth, the United States would ostensibly oppose 
the spread of communism anywhere in the world.  Truman Doctrine Address, supra. But see 
Ireland, supra note 18, at 27 (suggesting the propriety of a more limited interpretation of 
Truman’s speech and observing that the Truman administration arguably backed away from the 
global implications of the Truman doctrine toward a “‘less ambitious . . . [goal] of restoring the 
balance of power in Europe.’” ) (quoting John Lewis Gaddis, Was the Truman Doctrine a 
Turning Point? Foreign Affairs 52, 2 (January 1974):  386–402).  
50 Ireland, supra note 18, at 22.   
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the Council was unable to agree on a plan for Germany’s future.51 On June 5, 1947, Secretary of 
State George Marshall gave the commencement address at Harvard University.52 In his speech, 
which proclaimed what became known as the Marshall Plan, Marshall stressed the importance of 
European recovery to the American and world economies, and it marked the beginning of an 
American led initiative to oversee and shepherd European recovery from World War Two.53 A 
 
51 See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Ireland, supra note 18, at 22 
(observing that Secretary of State Marshall’s  pessimism regarding the chances for success at the 
Moscow Conference was well founded).    
 
52 Ireland supra note 18, at 36.  
 
53 See Ireland, supra note 18, at 36.  Although Marshall ultimately asserted that the 
initiative must come from the Europeans, he stated that 
[t]he truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next 3 
or 4 years of foreign food and other essential products—principally 
from America —are so much greater than her present ability to pay 
that she must have substantial additional help, or face economic, 
social, and political deterioration of a very grave character. The 
remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the 
confidence of the European people in the economic future of their 
own countries and of Europe as a whole. . . . Aside from the 
demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of 
disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people 
concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States 
should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should 
do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal 
economic health in the world, without which there can be no 
political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not 
against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, 
desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of 
working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of 
political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. 
Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis 
as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government 
may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere 
palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of 
recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the 
United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to 
block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. 
Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek 
17
corollary of the American-led European recovery program was an exacerbation of the U.S.-
Soviet relationship which, in turn, facilitated the growing American realization that a greater 
U.S. investment in European security was required.54 
Actually, serious discussion regarding active American involvement in the European 
security framework had begun one month earlier with a report issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS).55 In their support, the JCS identified the Soviet military as the principal threat to U.S. 
security, and, as such, the thrust of the JCS position was the argument that western Europe was 
an essential component in the United States’ global strategy to counterbalance Soviet military 
power.56 Thus, “by linking U.S. security to that of western Europe, the Joint Chiefs emphasized 
the growing concept of Atlantic security.”57 
to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically 
or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.
Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Marshall Plan Speech, June 5, 1947 
available at 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/03/documents/marshall.plan/(
emphasis added).   
 
54 For example, just one month after Secretary of State Marshall’s announcement of 
the European recovery program, Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov exhorted Communist parties 
across Europe to undermine the Marshall Plan, and, as a result, Communists initiated strikes in 
France and Italy.  Ireland, supra note 18, at 54.  These Soviet-influenced attempts to subvert the 
Marshall Plan would lead to a growing consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that bolstering 
European security was an essential prerequisite to the successful implementation of the European 
recovery program.   Ireland, supra note 18, at 54.   
 
55 See Ireland, supra note 18, at 32.   
 
56 See Ireland, supra note 18, at 33–32.  Specifically, the JCS  
maintained that in a future “ideological war” the United States 
would have to utilize the resources of the countries of the “Old 
World,” which were “potentially powerful and also potential allies 
of the United States.”  The Joint Chiefs pointed out the fact that  
two world wars had demonstrated the interdependence of the 
United States and western Europe in case of war with central or 
eastern European powers, and they maintained that the western 
countries were “in mortal peril” if they did not unite their forces.  
18
i. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance or Rio Pact, signed on September 2, 
1947, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, was significant in the historical development of United States’ 
post-World War Two security policy because many of its provisions would serve as models for 
the North Atlantic Treaty.58 The purpose of the Rio Pact was to establish a system of western 
hemispheric security which would deter acts of aggression directed at any of the signatory 
nations.59 Specifically, Article three of the Rio Pact was the treaty’s manifestation of the 
collective security concept stating “that an armed attack by any State against an American State 
shall be considered as an attack against all the American States . . . .” 60 Further, Article four of 
 
Ireland, supra note 18, at 33 (quoting U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1947, vol. 1, General:  United Nations, pp. 734–36; 
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enclosure dated April 29, 1947.) 
(quotations in original).      
 
57 See Ireland, supra note 18, at 33 (emphasis added). 
 
58 See Ireland, supra note 18, at 38.   
 
59 See Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Article III (September 2, 
1947); see also Ireland, supra note 18, at 37 (observing that the purpose of the Rio Pact was 
remedy the insecurity felt by nations of the western hemisphere as a result of World War Two).  
 
60 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Article III (September 2, 1947).  
The pertinent portions of Article three state that 
 an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be 
considered as an attack against all the American States and, 
consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes 
to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations.  On the request of the State or 
States directly attacked . . . each one of the Contracting Parties may 
determine the immediate measures which it may individually take 
in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding 
paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental 
solidarity. . . . 
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the treaty defined the territory to which Article three was applicable. 61 Importantly, Article six 
of the Rio Pact implicitly recognized the increasingly global nature of American security 
policy.62 These provisions of the Rio Pact proved significant  because they provided a useful 
point of reference when the United States and the nations of western Europe convened to 
establish a collective defense arrangement of their own—the North Atlantic Treaty.   
b. The European Response 
 In the immediate post-war period, the major western European powers, Great Britain and 
France, viewed the Soviet Union’s military and political domination of eastern Europe and 
diplomatic intransigence with the same unease and discontent as their American ally.63 Yet, 
unlike the United States, Great Britain and France were less well equipped to combat the Soviet 
threat because, in contrast to the United States, both nations had sustained two more years of war 
and the concomitant drain on manpower and resources.64 Consequently, both were faced with 
rebuilding a war-ravaged domestic infrastructure and with the cost of administering the remnants 
of their respective global empires.65 As a result, the United States was able to recognize and 
react more quickly to the Soviet Union’s increasingly hostile foreign policy, and the western 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  As the italicized language indicates, the signatory nations retained 
discretionary authority when determining their response to an invocation of Article III.  See id.
61 Article four defined the geographic region covered by the treaty as the continents 
of North and South America including Greenland, all adjacent waters including the Caribbean, 
and the polar regions lying north and south of the two continents.  See Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance, Article IV (September 2, 1947).    
 
62 Ireland, supra, note 18, at 39.    
 
63 zu Löwenstein & von Zühlsdorff, supra note 19, at 50.   
64 Id. at 51. 
 
65 Id.
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European powers were forced to rely more heavily on the United States for leadership and 
material support.66 Thus, the response of the western European powers to the Soviet threat is 
best understood as an extension of the American reaction. 
1.     The Brussels Treaty 
Restoring the balance of power in Europe was an essential aspect of the United States’ 
security policy;67 however, European initiative was needed for the accomplishment of that goal.68 
The genesis of the European initiative began after the failure of the November 1947 Council of 
Foreign Ministers Conference in London 69 with a proposal by British Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin to create a Western Union.70 As a basis of his western European security concept, Bevin 
advocated the formulation of a multilateral treaty between Great Britain, France, and the Benelux 
 
66 See id.
67 See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.   
 
68 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, vol. 1, 
General:  United Nations, pp. 772; Report of the Policy Planning Staff.  This November 6, 1947 
report declared that the United States had 
borne almost single handed the burden of the international effort to 
stop the Kremlin’s political advance.  But this has stretched our 
resources dangerously far in several respects. . . . In these 
circumstances it is clearly unwise for us to continue the attempt to 
carry alone, or largely single handed, the opposition to Soviet 
expansion.  It is urgently necessary for us to restore something of 
the balance of power in Europe and Asia by strengthening local 
forces of independence and getting them to assume part of our 
burden.   
Id.
69 Ireland, supra note 18, at 55; Ismay, supra note 18, at 5. 
 
70 Ireland, supra note 18, at 63. 
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nations modeled after the Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk.71 Although the British envisaged the 
eventual participation of Germany in the security arrangement, the plan met with sharp criticism 
on both sides of the Atlantic.72 Specifically, the United States faulted the plan to utilize the 
Treaty of Dunkirk as a model because they feared alienating Germany, whose eventual 
participation the United States believed was critical to the success of a European security 
organization.73 Further, the United States believed that the proposed Western Union should be 
aimed at containment of the Soviet threat and, therefore, suggested the Rio Pact as a more 
suitable model.74 Thus, “[i]t is important to note that the Rio Pact formula and the eventual 
inclusion of Germany were emerging as essential prerequisites for American involvement”75 in 
the European security framework.   
During the course of these discussions, the Europeans renewed their push for closer 
American involvement in the proposed European security arrangement.76 At that stage, 
 
71 Ireland, supra note 18, at 63.  The Treaty of Dunkirk was a bilateral defense 
agreement signed by Great Britain and France on March 4, 1947 and was designed to protect 
against a renewal of German aggression. zu Löwenstein & von Zühlsdorff, supra note 19, at 48.   
72 Ireland, supra note 18, at 64.  Belgian Prime Minister, Paul Henri Spaak, 
commented “that unless this Pact was meant as a screen behind which to consider defenses 
against Russia, it was meaningless because of Germany’s present position.”  FRUS, 1947, vol. 3, 
4–5; Hickerson to Marshall.   
 
73 Ireland, supra note 18, at 64.   
 
74 Ireland, supra note 18, at 64–65.  French strategic thinking was neurotically 
obsessed with the possibility of renewed German aggression, a security perspective which their 
American and European counterparts believed to be anachronistic.  Ireland, supra note 18, at 64–
74.     
 
75 Ireland, supra note 18, at 64.   
 
76 Ireland, supra note 18, at 55–56 & 64–65.  Paul Henri Spaak observed “that any 
defense arrangement which did not include the United States would be without practical value.”  
FRUS, 1947, vol. 3, 4–5; Hickerson to Marshall.   
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however, the United States was unwilling to formally commit to a transatlantic security alliance 
because it feared jeopardizing the passage of Marshall’s European recovery program in 
Congress.77 Thus, the onus was on the Europeans to bring the security concept to fruition.   
Formal negotiations aimed at solidifying the Western Union concept were scheduled to begin 
in March of 1947, but, before the talks got underway, events in eastern Europe illuminated the 
preeminence of the Soviet threat to western European security.  On February 25, 1948, 
Communist forces overthrew the democratically elected government of Czechoslovakia and 
installed a pro-Soviet regime.78 Two weeks later, when the representatives of Great Britain, 
France, and the Benelux nations convened in Brussels, the Soviet sponsored Prague coup was 
foremost in their minds.79 The delegates agreed upon and signed the Treaty of Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defense, or Brussels Treaty, on March 17, 1948.80 
The agreement allayed French insecurity with respect to Germany and laid the groundwork for 
eventual German participation.81 Moreover, Article four, the collective self-defense provision, 
 
77 Ireland, supra note 18, at 65–66.  Despite American reluctance to formally 
associate with the European efforts, a growing number of U.S. officials viewed American 
involvement as a necessary component for the achievement of a successful European security 
framework.     
 
78 zu Löwenstein & von Zühlsdorff, supra note 19, at 48.   
 
79 zu Löwenstein & von Zühlsdorff, supra note 19, at 50.   
 
80 Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-
defense (March 17, 1948) available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/westeu/we001.htm. 
 
81 See Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-
defense (March 17, 1948) available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/westeu/we001.htm.  The Treaty’s preamble declares 
that the signatories are committed  
[t]o afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and 
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contemplated the more serious, overarching threat to European security—the Soviet Union.82 
Significantly, Article four requires military assistance in the event one of parties to the 
agreement is attacked; in contrast to the Rio Pact,83 the Brussels Treaty does not afford discretion 
to its signatories.84 The Brussels Treaty was important because it demonstrated to the United 
States that Europe was prepared to shoulder the burden of its defense and, ultimately, helped 
facilitate the involvement of the United States in the European system of collective defense. 
 
c. The Unification of Trans-Atlantic Collective Defense 
Six days prior to the March 1948 signing of the Brussels Treaty, the process of forging a 
trans-Atlantic collective defense organization began when the British informed the United States 
 
security and in resisting any policy of aggression; [t]o take such 
steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by 
Germany of a policy of aggression; [and] [t]o associate 
progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired 
by the same ideals and animated by the like determination . . . . 
Id.
82 See Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-
defense, Article IV, (March 17, 1948) available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/westeu/we001.htm.  Article four declares:   
If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an 
armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and 
other aid and assistance in their power.  
Id.
83 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.   
84 Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-
defense, Article IV, (March 17, 1948) available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/westeu/we001.htm.   
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that the Soviet Union was pressuring Norway to execute a bilateral security agreement.85 British 
Foreign Secretary Bevin perceived the Soviet’s Norwegian overture as a threat to both the North 
Atlantic area and to the ongoing efforts to create a Western Union in Brussels.86 Foreign 
Secretary Bevin proposed that the British and Americans begin immediate consultations in order 
to develop and implement a trans-Atlantic security framework that would “inspire the necessary 
confidence to consolidate the West against Soviet infiltration and at the same time inspire the 
Soviet government with enough respect for the West to remove the temptation from them and 
insure a long period of peace.”87 Secretary of State Marshall concurred, and the process which 
spawned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formally conceived.88 
Nevertheless, the process of transforming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization a reality 
was fraught with controversy.  First, the United States, although certainly anxious to restore the 
balance of power in Europe, was leery about making entangling, long-term commitments to 
European security.89 The Europeans, in contrast, anxiously and frequently pressed for a formal 
 
85 FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, 46–48, the British Embassy to the Department of State.  
Norway wished to reject the Soviet proposal but sought reassurance that the western powers 
would support them.  Id.
86 FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, 47, the British Embassy to the Department of State.  
 
87 FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, 48, the British Embassy to the Department of State.  
 
88 FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, 48, Marshall to Inverchapel.  On the same day the Western 
Union defense pact was signed in Brussels, President Truman apprised Congress of the recent 
European developments.  Ireland, supra note 18, at 73–74.  Truman expressed his confidence 
“that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which 
the situation requires.”  Additionally, Truman confidently added “that the determination of the 
free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our 
part to help them protect themselves.”  Ismay, supra note 18, at 4.   
 
89 See Ireland, supra note 18, at 80–114.   
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American commitment to become and stay involved in European security.90 Correspondingly, 
the Europeans advocated a treaty formula as the best method by which to secure the United 
States’ active involvement.91 However, much to the chagrin of the Europeans, some in the 
American foreign policy establishment did not favor a treaty; instead, these persons suggested 
that a Presidential declaration was a more desirable alternative for evincing a formal U.S. 
commitment to European security.92 Despite the disagreement, pro-treaty elements in the 
American foreign policy community were slowly gaining the upper hand, and, meanwhile, trans-
Atlantic consultations continued in earnest with the Europeans doggedly insisting on the treaty 
format.  
On June 11, 1948, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, proposed a resolution (Vandenberg Resolution), submitting it to the Senate for a 
floor vote.93 The purpose of the Vandenberg Resolution was to assure the Europeans of the 
United States’ good faith commitment to proceeding on the trans-Atlantic security initiative 
without undertaking any permanent obligations.94 The Vandenberg Resolution was 
 
90 Ireland, supra note 18, at 80–114.  After coming to Europe’s aid in World War 
One, the United States reverted back to their traditional isolationist foreign policy in the interwar 
period, and the Europeans were anxious to prevent a resurgence of American isolationism.      
 
91 Ireland, supra note 18, at 81. 
 
92 Ireland, supra note 18, at 82–85. 
 
93 Ireland, supra note 18, at 99. 
94 See S. Res. 239, 90th Cong., 2d sess., June 11, 1948; see also Ireland, supra note 
18, at 93 (quoting statements made by Senator Vandenberg). Per the Vandenberg Resolution, the 
Senate recommended, inter alia, that the United States pursue the following objectives within the 
parameters of the United Nations Charter:  
 (2) Progressive development of regional and other collective 
arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in 
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overwhelmingly approved by the Senate,95 but European fears were not assuaged; they continued 
to insist on a treaty-based trans-Atlantic security pact.96 
Subsequently, the United States agreed to host representatives from France, Great Britain, 
Canada, Belgium, and the Netherlands in Washington for the purpose of holding ”top-secret 
exploratory talks pursuant to the Vandenberg Resolution.”97 The talks were scheduled to start on 
June 29, but, before they began, Soviet actions again imbued the western nations with a sense of 
urgency.98 Despite the Berlin crisis, the Washington meetings provided an opportunity for the 
United States to be unyielding—the Americans insisted that any treaty or military aid program 
must be based on the Vandenberg Resolution and that any collective defense provision be based 
 
accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the 
Charter.  
(3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process, 
with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based 
on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect 
its national security.  
(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its 
determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-
defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting 
its national security.  
S. Res. 239, 90th Cong., 2d sess., June 11, 1948.  
 
95 Ireland, supra note 18, at 99. 
 
96 Ireland, supra note 18, at 98. 
 
97 Ireland, supra note 18, at 100. 
 
98 See Ireland, supra note 18, at 100–01. On June 24, 1948, the Soviet authorities in 
Berlin imposed a full blockade of the city, effectively besieging Allied-controlled West Berlin.  
zu Löwenstein & von Zühlsdorff, supra note 19, at 54.  The French felt severely threatened by 
the Soviet blockade of Berlin and, consequently, began requesting immediate U.S. military 
assistance and the rapid conclusion of the treaty as soon as they arrived in Washington.    Ireland, 
supra note 18, at 101–02. 
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on the Rio Pact.99 The Europeans, especially the French, were not pleased; they favored the 
collective-defense provision of the Brussels Treaty which mandated automatic military response 
in the event of aggression.100 However, the United States, which had essentially acceded to the 
European demands for security arrangement based on a treaty formula, remained firm and 
predicated their participation in a trans-Atlantic security pact on the adoption of a Rio-Pact-style 
collective-defense provision.101 
Throughout the summer of 1948, the Washington conferees discussed and analyzed the 
details of the proposed alliance.102 The parties agreed that invitations to join the envisioned 
North Atlantic security system be extended to other western European nations.103 The conferees 
also agreed that any collective defense provision must enable the proposed alliance to meet 
aggression “from whatever quarter and at whatever time.”104 Yet, the specific wording of the 
collective-defense provision remained a sticking point.105 The Europeans preferred the 
automatic guarantee language of the Brussels Treaty’s article four106 while the Americans, for 
 
99 Ireland, supra note 18, at 102. 
 
100 Ireland, supra note 18, at 102–05. 
 
101 Ireland, supra note 18, at 102–12. 
 
102 Ireland, supra note 18, at 104–07. 
 
103 Ismay, supra note 18, at 10.   
104 FRUS, 1948, vol.3, 242; Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington 
Security Talks, July 6–September 9, Submitted to Their Respective Governments for Study and 
Comment.   
 
105 Ireland, supra note 18, at 104–07. 
106 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  
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constitutional reasons,107 insisted upon the discretionary language contained in article three of 
the Rio Pact.  This time, it was the Europeans who reluctantly acquiesced, and what became 
Article five of the North Atlantic Treaty included the discretionary language insisted by the 
United States.108 
Finally, on April 4, 1949, twelve western nations109 convened in Washington D.C. to sign the 
North Atlantic Treaty.110 Despite disagreement and after many months of careful deliberation, 
the nations of the West concluded one of history’s greatest compromises.  The fourteen articles 
of the North Atlantic Treaty forged what would become the world’s most powerful collective- 
defense organization.   Relying on a common heritage and committed to the principles of 
democracy, the nations of the West cemented the trans-Atlantic bond and stood united under the 
aegis of NATO.111 
107 Although the President retains certain war powers, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1,  
the United States Constitution requires that declaration of war shall come from Congress. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.  
 
108 See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 
246.; supra note 58 and accompanying text.   
 
109 The twelve original NATO member states were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and the 
United States.  Ismay, supra note 18, at 11. 
 
110 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 
246. 
111 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246. 
The Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty states: 
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to 
live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are 
determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and 
civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to 
promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They 
are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the 
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III.  ARTICLE 5 
 NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, very succinctly observed that Article 5 is 
the “core” of the North Atlantic Treaty.112 It is the embodiment of the signatory nations’ 
commitment to collective self-defense.  Article 5 states:   
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken 
as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.113 
Although Article 5 was conceived with two specific threats in mind, 114 the Washington 
conferees indicated that the provision was designed to meet any threat “from whatever 
quarter and at whatever time.”115 Addressing the Senate on July 6, 1949, Senator 
Vandenberg declared:  “The pledge [Article 5] dependably means that whoever is 
 
preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this 
North Atlantic Treaty. 
Id.
112 Ismay, supra note 18, at 13. 
 
113 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 
246. 
 
114 Ireland, supra note 18, at 101–12.  The preeminent threat, feared by all of the 
signatory nations, was the danger posed by the Soviet Union’s aggressive foreign policy and 
desire to extend their political domination across Europe; however, the French also feared the 
possibility of German revanchism.   Ireland, supra note 18, at 101–12. 
 
115 FRUS, 1948, vol.3, 242; Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington 
Security Talks, July 6–September 9, Submitted to Their Respective Governments for Study and 
Comment.   
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attacked will have dependable allies who will do their dependable part, by constitutional 
process, as swiftly as possible to defeat the aggressor by whatever means necessary.”116 
Thus, the text and drafting history of Article 5 clearly elucidates the clause’s strength and 
flexibility. 
 For forty-two years, the great strength of Article 5 was its deterrent value.  The 
Article helped enable the West to endure the Cold War while avoiding a military conflict 
with the Soviet Union.  In 1991, the Soviet Union fell with NATO having never once 
invoked Article 5.  With the disintegration of NATO’s chief adversary, many short-
sighted critics questioned the future utility of the alliance, and some even recommended 
its dissolution.  Yet, as history has so often demonstrated, potential enemies are never in 
short supply.  
 As early as 1999, NATO strategic planners specifically mentioned terrorism as 
one of the emerging security threats facing the alliance in the twenty-first century.117 
Consonant with that assessment, the 1999 Strategic Concept reiterated that “[a]ny armed 
attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by 
Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.”118 Unfortunately, NATO’s strategic planners 
could not predict the dire accuracy of their analysis.  Barely twenty-nine months after 
issuing the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO came face to face with its newest enemy:  
international terrorism.  As a result of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks on New York 
 
116 Ismay, supra note 18, at 13.   
117 See The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, paragraph 24 (1999) available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.   
 
118 The 1999 Strategic Concept further stated that “alliance security must also 
take account of the global context. . . .”  Id.
31
and Washington, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its fifty-three year history, 
and the era of NATO counterterrorism officially began.  
IV. NATO COUNTERTERRORISM 
On October 2, 2001, the North Atlantic Council119 invoked Article 5 and, thus, 
became involved in assisting the United States’ military campaign in Afghanistan.120 
Since that time, NATO has continued to contribute to the fight against terrorism, and 
their support is well documented.121 However, NATO’s most significant and lasting 
contribution may be yet to come.  In the aftermath of September 11, NATO committed to 
develop and implement an aggressive counterterrorism programme—an unprecedented 
step for a collective defense organization.  
A.  NATO’S Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism 
On December 18, 2001, NATO Defense Ministers requested that NATO Military 
planners create a Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism (Terrorism Defense 
Concept).122 The North Atlantic Council and the NATO Heads of State approved the 
Terrorism Defense Concept at the Prague Summit on November 21, 2002.123 In 
 
119 The North Atlantic Council is NATO’s governing body and possesses “effective 
political authority and powers of decision” over alliance actions.  NATO Handbook, Chapter 7:  
Policy and Decision Making:  The North Atlantic Council, available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070101.htm.   
 
120 NATO Press Release, October 2, 2001 available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm. 
 
121 See NATO Issues available at http://www.nato.int/terrorism/index.htm#a.
122 NATO Press Release, December 18, 2001 available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-173e.htm.
123 NATO Press Release, Prague Summit Declaration, November 21, 2002 available 
at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm.   
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developing the Terrorism Defense Concept, the military planners were guided by the 
North Atlantic Treaty, the 1999 Strategic Concept,124 and NATO’s terrorism threat 
assessment.125 Further, the North Atlantic Council advised that any actions 
recommended by NATO’s Terrorism Defense Concept should “have a sound legal basis 
and fully conform to the relevant provisions of the UN Charter and all relevant 
international norms . . . .”126 The resulting Terrorism Defense Concept provides a 
comprehensive framework for combating the scourge of terrorism.127 
The most revolutionary element of the Terrorism Defense Concept is undoubtedly 
NATO’s counterterrorism programme.128 As NATO defines it, counterterrorism is “offensive 
 
124 See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.  
125  NATO Issues, Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism, available at 
http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm. NATO’s terrorism threat assessment concluded:  
• Although religious extremism is likely to be the source of the 
most immediate terrorist threats to the Alliance, other 
motivations for terrorism could emerge from economic, social, 
demographic and political causes derived from unresolved 
conflicts or emerging ideologies. 
• In addition, although state sponsorship of terrorism is currently 
in decline, political circumstances could lead to its rise, 
providing terrorists with safe havens and considerable 
resources. 
• Although the predominant form of terrorist attack remains the 
creative use of conventional weapons and explosives, terrorist 
groups are expected to strive for the most destructive means 
available, including Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
Id.
126 Id.
127 See NATO Issues, Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism, 
http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm. 
128 The Terrorism Defense Concept’s counterterrorism component declares that 
“[a]llied nations agree that terrorists should not be allowed to base, train, plan, stage and execute 
terrorist actions and that the threat may be severe enough to justify acting against these terrorists 
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military action designed to reduce terrorists’ capabilities.”129 The Terrorism Defense Concept 
contemplates a two-pronged approach to counterterrorism:  NATO in the lead130 and NATO in 
support.131 Of the two, the concept of NATO in the lead most effectively demonstrates NATO’s 
 
and those who harbour them, as and where required, as decided by the North Atlantic Council.” 
Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. The Terrorism Defense Concept’s description of NATO in the lead envisions 
an aggressive, leading role for NATO forces in counterterrorism operations.  Id. Accordingly, 
the Terrorism Defense Concept observed that the following planning aspects required special 
attention: 
• Procedures and capabilities that support accelerated decision cycles, in order 
to be successful in detecting and attacking time sensitive targets in the 
Counter Terrorist environment. 
• Access to flexible and capable Joint-Fires, ranging from precision-guided 
stand-off weapons to direct conventional fires.  
• The need for more specialised anti-terrorist forces      
131 Id. The Terrorism Defense Concept’s description of NATO in support envisions 
the use of NATO forces in a secondary or support role such as NATO cooperation with the 
counterterrorism operations of other entities including possibly the European Union and 
coalitions of NATO members.  Id. The Terrorism Defense Concept suggests that potential 
NATO counterterrorism support operations may include:   
• A role as coalition enabler and interoperability provider. 
• The ability to back-fill national requirements. An example of 
this was when NATO deployed to the United States in order to 
free US Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to 
deploy to Afghanistan.  
• Forward deploying of forces in support of the broader coalition 
efforts. An example of this was the deployment of NATO 
maritime forces to the eastern Mediterranean.  
• The expression of political and military commitment.  
• Practical support as manifested by Host Nation Support and 
logistic assistance, including over flight and basing rights.  
• The use of NATO’s operational planning and force generation 
capabilities to plan a mission and generate a force for a 
coalition of like-minded NATO members, and also help to 
support and sustain that operation.  
Id.
34
commitment to pursuing and executing aggressive counterterrorism operations,132 and, 
henceforth, references to NATO counterterrorism will be devoted to a discussion of the NATO in 
the lead concept. 
 However, at the time the NATO in the lead concept was approved in November 
2002, NATO military planners recognized that NATO did not possess the capabilities 
required to execute effective counterterrorism missions.133 Therefore, the drafters of the 
Terrorism Defense Concept recommended several changes which they deemed necessary 
for improving the capability of NATO forces to conduct successful counterterrorism 
operations.134 The Terrorism Defense Concept proposed that NATO focus on developing 
“[p]rocedures and capabilities that support accelerated decision cycles, in order to be 
successful in detecting and attacking time sensitive targets in the Counter Terrorist 
environment. . . [and] more specialised anti-terrorist forces.”135 In 2002, these two 
recommendations were mere proposals; today one of them is a bona fide reality.   
B. NATO RESPONSE FORCE  
 The idea of a NATO rapid reaction force was first suggested by U.S. Secretary of 
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, at the Warsaw NATO Defense Ministers meetings held in 
September 2002.136 Two months later, NATO leaders, recognizing that the NATO 
 
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id. The architects of the Terrorism Defense Concept also suggested that 
NATO upgrade its command and control and intelligence infrastructure and maintain forces at 
optimal readiness levels.  Id.
135 Id.
136 NATO Speeches, Address by U.S. Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, 
(September 25, 2002) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020925c.htm.  
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military structure was “overburdened by excessive and inflexible Cold War era 
infrastructure . . . designed for traditional 20th century defence and warfare,”137 
announced that the theme of the Prague Summit was transforming NATO to meet the 
security challenges of the twenty-first century,138 especially terrorism. 139 Consequently, 
NATO leaders formally recommended the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), 
and the Prague Declaration listed the development of the NRF as the first step toward the 
accomplishment of NATO’s military transformation.140 
On October 13, 2004, the alliance completed the first major step toward the 
realization of its transformation goal as NATO proclaimed that the NRF had “reached 
initial operational capability and . . . [was] ready to take on the full range of missions 
 
137 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, NATO 
Response Force – Background, available at http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfa.htm.  
 
138 NATO Press Release, Prague Summit Declaration, paragraph 1, (November 21, 
2002) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm. 
 
139 See Prague Declaration, supra note 7 and accompanying text.  In Prague, then 
Secretary-General Lord Robertson commented that “NATO must change radically if it is to be 
effective…. It must modernise or be marginalized.” Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE) Statement, NATO Response Force – Background, available at 
http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfa.htm.     
140 NATO Press Release, Prague Summit Declaration, paragraph 4(a), (November 
21, 2002) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm.  Indeed, the Prague 
Declaration asserted that the NRF would “be a catalyst for focusing and promoting 
improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities.”  Id. Appropriately, NATO tasked General 
James L. Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the thirty-second Commandant of 
the United States Marine Corps, with the job of making the NRF a reality.  Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, NATO Response Force – Background, 
available at http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfa.htm.  The choice of a distinguished 
Marine Corps General for the task of developing and implementing the NRF is hardly surprising 
since the NRF represents the embodiment of the Marine Corps philosophy.  NEED CITE.   
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where and when the Alliance decides to use it.”141 The NRF combines air, ground, sea, 
intelligence, logistics, combat services, and support elements into one cohesive force.142 
Presently, the NRF is comprised of 17,000 troops, and that number is expected to reach 
21,000 by the time the NRF attains full operational capability.143 NATO cautions that the 
NRF will not be a standing force; rather, it will be comprised of troop contributions from 
NATO countries “which will rotate through periods of training and certification as a joint 
force.”144 Further, the alliance anticipates that, when the NRF reaches full operational 
capability, it will possess the capacity to deploy anywhere in the world within five days 
and will have the ability to sustain itself for one month or longer if re-supplied.145 With 
such formidable assets and capabilities, the NRF certainly appears “prepared to tackle the 
full spectrum of military missions.”146 Yet, the question remains:  which missions?  
 
141 NATO Update, Response Force Ready For Missions, (October  13, 2004) 
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/10-october/e1013a.htm.   
 
142 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, The NATO 
Response Force – NRF, available at http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm.  
In fact, NATO lauds the NRF as “a coherent, high readiness, joint, multinational force package, 
technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable.” NATO Issues, 
The NATO Response Force, available at http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html.  
 
143 NATO Update, Response Force Ready For Missions, (October  13, 2004) 
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/10-october/e1013a.htm.  NATO expects the 
NRF to reach full operational capability by October 2006.  Id.
144 NATO Issues, The NATO Response Force, available at 
http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html.  
145 NATO Update, Response Force Ready For Missions, (October  13, 2004) 
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/10-october/e1013a.htm. 
 
146 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, The NATO 
Response Force – NRF, available at http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm.  
Regarding the NRF, General Jones observed that “[t]hrough successful integration, you get a 
more capable force that can accomplish more things. The symmetry gained from the cohesion of 
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 Although NATO envisages the utilization of the NRF for a variety of potential 
missions,147 it appears that NRF is intended to be one of the linchpins of NATO’s 
counterterrorism programme.  The first and most obvious indication is that NATO has, 
on more than one occasion, expressly stated that the NRF will be utilized for 
counterterrorism operations.148 Second, the Terrorism Defense Concept’s 
counterterrorism component, which was approved contemporaneously with the approval 
for the creation of the NRF,149 specifically recommended the development of “more 
specialised anti-terrorist forces.”150 Such simultaneity further supports the inference that 
the decision to create the NRF was, at least in part, a response to the recommendation 
made in the Terrorism Defense Concept’s counterterrorism component.  A final 
indication that NATO developed the NRF for its potent counterterrorism potential is the 
 
the sea, land and air resources allows forces to operate at greater distances, more efficiently and 
more successfully than operating in isolation or parallel situations.”  Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, The NATO Response Force – Challenges, available 
at http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfe.htm.   
 
147 NATO Issues, The NATO Response Force, available at 
http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html; Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE) Statement, NATO Response Force – Role, available at 
http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfb.htm. 
 
148 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, NATO 
Response Force – Role, available at http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfb.htm; see 
also NATO Press Release, Prague Summit Declaration, paragraph 4(a), (November 21, 2002) 
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm (evincing an intent to utilize the 
NRF to combat terrorism); Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, 
NATO Response Force – Background, available at
http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfa.htm (indicating that the NRF will be used for 
counterterrorism operations).  
 
149 NATO Press Release, Prague Summit Declaration, paragraph 4(a) & (d), 
(November 21, 2002) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm.   
 
150 NATO Issues, Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism, 
http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm. 
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fact the NRF’s first training operation involved a counterterrorism scenario.151 Based on 
the foregoing, it is clear that NATO intends the NRF to be the vanguard of the alliance’s 
military transformation and constitutes the manifestation of NATO’s recognition “that 
modern, flexible, rapidly deployable joint, meaning sea, land and air forces are required 
to meet and defeat today’s asymmetrical threats, the most notable one being 
terrorism.”152 Moreover, the aggregate effect of these facts reveals that enhancing 
NATO’s counterterrorism capabilities was one of the primary reasons for the creation of 
the NRF.153 
In addition to significantly enhancing NATO’s capacity to conduct 
counterterrorism operations, the NRF provides NATO with unprecedented global 
reach.154 For example, part of the mission in the NRF’s first training exercise was the 
conduct of counterterrorism operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area.155 The NRF’s 
 
151 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, NATO 
Response Force First Exercise, available at 
http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/11/i031121a.htm.  At a November 2003 training operation 
in Turkey, the NRF was “deployed by air, sea and land to counter a fictional threat to UN staff 
and civilians from terrorists and hostile soldiers in a country outside the Euro-Atlantic area. The 
forces rescued and evacuated the UN staff and civilians, established an embargo, engaged in 
counter-terrorist operations and a show of force.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
 
152 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, NATO 
Response Force – Background, available at http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfa.htm 
(emphasis added).   
 
153 In fact, at the NRF’s first operational exercise, General Jones observed that the 
decision to develop the NRF “marks an important recognition on the part of the Alliance that the 
international security environment has changed dramatically.” Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, NATO Response Force First Exercise, available at 
http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/11/i031121a.htm.   
 
154 1991 Gulf War or ISAF deployment to Afghanistan - - NEED TIMETABLE 
 
155 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.   
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rapid worldwide deployment capability is by design,156 and NATO anticipates that, when 
called upon, the NRF will be able to deploy anywhere in the world within five days.157 
From the outset, NATO has evinced its intent to utilize the NRF as a tool for 
projecting substantial force across the globe,158 and a review of the NRF’s evolution 
demonstrates that NATO expects counterterrorism to be one of the NRF’s operational 
specialties.159 Further, NATO has frequently emphasized that the NRF is “[a]t the centre 
of NATO transformation.”160 Thus, it seems clear that alliance intends an aggressive 
counterterrorism programme to be a key facet of NATO’s twenty-first century security 
strategy.  However, the question then becomes:  can NATO, a collective defense 
organization, justify its counterterrorism programme under the provisions of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, and, if so, do the terms of the treaty foreclose NATO’s ability to conduct 
effective counterterrorism operations?   
156 See NATO Press Release, Prague Summit Declaration, paragraph 4(a), 
(November 21, 2002) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm.  
 
157 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, The NATO 
Response Force – NRF, available at http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm.  
SHAPE has commented that “[t]he NRF provides the Alliance with a comprehensive set of sea, 
land and air resources, highly trained and capable of immediate response wherever and whenever 
they are required.” Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Statement, The 
NATO Response Force – Challenges, available at 
http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrfe.htm.   
 
158 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.   
 
159 See supra p. 32–36 and notes 129–49.    
 
160 E.g., NATO Issues, The NATO Response Force, available at 
http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html;  NATO Speeches, Remarks by NATO Secretary 
General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the 2004 Istanbul Summit (June 27, 2004), available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040627b.htm.   
 
40
V. THE PROPRIETY OF NATO’S COUNTETERRORISM PROGRAM UNDER 
ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
Regardless of the mindless, sociopathic rhetoric of terrorists, it must first be 
recognized that terrorism poses a threat to the entire international community and, indeed, 
civilized society.161 Precisely because it is a global problem, NATO’s decision to 
become involved in aggressively combating the scourge of terrorism is highly 
commendable.  The decision reflects the alliance’s deep sense of social responsibility, 
and, as an international organization, it is, in essence, NATO’s civic duty to become 
involved.   
Nonetheless, NATO counterterrorism is a different matter.  Since, by NATO’s 
definition, counterterrorism is involves offensive military action ,162 NATO must receive 
the authority to engage in counterterrorism operations from the North Atlantic Treaty 
itself.  If the text of the North Atlantic Treaty does not grant such authority, NATO’s 
conduct of counterterrorism operations would be illegal under international law.  Thus, 
the first, apposite inquiry is whether the North Atlantic Treaty permits NATO’s 
aggressive, global operations capable counterterrorism programme? The answer is a 
resounding yes.   
First, NATO’s counterterrorism programme is not inconsistent with NATO’s historic role as 
a collective defense organization.163 Article 5, which embodies the principle of collective self-
 
161 U.N Security Council Resolution 1368 (September 12, 2001).   
 
162 See supra p. 30 and note 121.   
 
163 Citing a report produced by the Cato Institute, at least one commentator has 
suggested that NATO’s efforts to combat terrorism by invoking Article Five do violence to 
NATO’s historical purpose:  collective defense.  See  Michael A. Goldberg, Note, Mirage Of 
Defense:  Reexamining Article Five Of The North Atlantic Treaty After The Terrorist Attacks On 
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defense, is the core of the North Atlantic Treaty,164 and, contrary to popular belief, Article 5 was 
not adopted solely to counter the Soviet threat.165 Rather, the drafters of the North Atlantic 
Treaty intended Article 5 to provide NATO with the flexibility to meet any threat “from 
whatever quarter and at whatever time.”166 No interpretational gymnastics are required to see 
that this founding principle of flexible, collective self-defense sufficiently encompasses NATO’s 
counterterrorism programme.   
Moreover, the alliance’s historic role as a collective defense organization 
currently provides NATO with the legal authority to conduct counterterrorism operations 
 
The United States, 26 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 77 (2003).  Mr. Goldberg associates 
counterterrorism with the principle of collective security and asserts that invocations of Article 5 
are appropriate only for collective defense.  Id. Thus, Goldberg concludes that Article 5 is an 
inappropriate legal basis upon which to ground NATO counterterrorism operations.  See id. Yet, 
even if there were some subtle semantic difference between the concept of collective defense and 
collective security, it appears to be a distinction without a difference because the former 
necessarily begets the latter.  In fact, the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty expressly states 
that one of NATO’s purposes is to preserve security through collective defense:  “[t]hey [the 
parties to the treaty] are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the 
preservation of peace and security.”   North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, Preamble, 63 Stat. 
2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.  Further, there does not seem to be any incongruence between 
pursuing security objectives and the establishment of a collective defense organization pursuant 
to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.  See Article 51 United Nations Charter.    
 
164 See supra Part III.   
 
165 See supra Part II.  Referring to the Cold War and the Soviet Union, one observer 
has commented that NATO “remains a creature of its time.  It is a collective defense 
organization whose sole adversary no longer exists.” Michael M. Gallagher, Comment, 
Declaring Victory And Getting Out [Of Europe]:  Why The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Should Disband, 25 Hous. J. Int’l L. 341, 359 (2003).  The drafting history of the North Atlantic 
Treaty demonstrates that Article Five was intended to be flexible enough to counter any threat.  
See supra p. 25 and note 97.  True, the treaty was formulated at a time when the United States 
and most of western Europe viewed the Soviet Union as the primary threat to global stability; 
however, at the same time, the French were equally, if not more so, concerned about the 
possibility of a resurgent, belligerent Germany.  See supra Part II.(b)–(c).               
 
166 See supra p. 25 and note 97.   
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anywhere in the world.  In the last three years alone, terrorism’s impact on the nations of 
NATO has been devastating.  On September 11, 2001, an estimated 3,000 persons died as 
a result of the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington, and the hijacking of United 
Airlines flight # 93 which crashed in Pennsylvania.167 During one week in November 
2003, deadly suicide bombings killed fifty persons and wounded at least 753 in Istanbul, 
Turkey.168 Less than four months later, on March 11, 2004, terrorists bombed commuter 
trains in Madrid, Spain; the attacks claimed the lives of 191 people and an additional 
1,800 were wounded.169 It is well documented that NATO invoked Article 5 after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, but each of these horrific, cowardly attacks on innocent 
civilians undoubtedly qualify as “armed attacks” under Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty.170 Because these tragic events give NATO the power to invoke Article 5, NATO 
has the legal authority to unleash its counterterrorism weapons against those 
responsible171 wherever in the world they may be found.172 
167 Cite 9/11 Commission Report 
 
168 Anonymous, Imperial Hubris 98 (Brassey’s Inc. 2004). Al Qaida claimed 
responsibility for the attacks.  Id. at 91.   
169 Id. at 100.  Al Qaida claimed responsibility for the Madrid attacks.  Id.
170 See supra p. 26 and note 106.      
 
171 Al Qaeda was responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks and has been 
implicated in the other two.  See supra p. 39 and notes 160–62.  Therefore, under Article Five, 
NATO has the authority to use armed force to destroy Al Qaeda or any other terrorist group 
complicit in those three attacks.   
 
172 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (September 28, 2001);  see 
North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.  As long as 
Article Five is properly invoked, the North Atlantic Treaty gives NATO the authority to use 
armed force anywhere in the world its enemies may be found.  See id.; see also Broderick C. 
Grady, Note, Article 5 Of The North Atlantic Treaty: Past, Present, And Uncertain Future, Ga. J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 167, 182 (2002) (observing that “[w]hen Article 5 is properly invoked pursuant 
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In addition to the legal authority provided by the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s 
aggressive counterterrorism programme may also be sanctioned by United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1373 (Resolution 1373).173 Resolution 1373 specifically 
reaffirms “the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts . . . .”174 
Further, Resolution 1373 “[c]alls upon all States to:  . . . [c]ooperate, particularly through 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist 
attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts.” 175 The language of Resolution 
1373 provides unambiguous legal authorization for any future NATO counterterrorism 
operations conducted in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.176 
to the geographical limits set by Article 6 . . . the out-of-area question becomes all but moot for 
future action outside Article 6 geography.”).  Of course, there is the obvious problem that 
terrorist groups may be harbored by sovereign states.  If that is the case, NATO’s ability to roam 
the globe and engage in counterterrorism operations may be curtailed.  See United Nations 
Charter Art. 2 § 4 (1945).     
 
173 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (September 28, 2001).   
 
174 Id. This statement clearly permits the use of force against terrorists.  Id. However, 
Resolution 1373’s authorization for the use of force is limited to situations involving self defense 
or collective self defense.  See United Nations Charter Art. 2 § 4 & Art. 51 (1945).    
 
175 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373(3)(c) (September 28, 2001) 
(emphasis added).  
 
176 See United Nations Charter Art. 2 § 4 & Art. 51 (1945); United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1373 (September 28, 2001); see also United Nations Security Council 
Counter-Terrorism Committee at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/.  Article 51 
provides:  
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right 
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Bloodshed and the loss of innocent lives have forced NATO to recognize that 
terrorism is one of the most dangerous threats to the security of the alliance nations in the 
twenty-first century.  As a result, NATO has spent the last twenty-six months developing 
a counterterrorism programme that appears both aggressive and potent.  Further, NATO 
has provided its counterterrorism assets with the capability to conduct operations 
anywhere on the globe.  Most importantly, however, NATO has present, legal authority 
to undertake and execute counterterrorism missions.  Critics incorrectly argue that NATO 
is incapable of aiding in the fight against international terrorism and that Article 5 
provides insufficient support for NATO’s counterterrorism efforts.177 The drafters of the 
North Atlantic treaty intended Article 5 to enable NATO to meet and resist any threat.  In 
the last three years, terrorists have attacked NATO member nations three times.  Clearly, 
terrorism represents a continuing threat to the alliance, and, Article 5, as it has for the last 
forty-four years, continues to provide a remedy.  Additionally, Resolution 1373 
reinforces the propriety of future NATO counterterrorism operations conducted in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.  Resolution 1373 strongly 
forbids U.N. member states from supporting or harboring terrorist groups.  Any state 
which ignores that mandate will be in violation of international law and, therefore, may 
find themselves targets of a NATO counterterrorism operation backed by the authority of 
the United Nations.   
 
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.    
United Nations Charter Art. 51 (1945). 
 
177 See supra note 13.   
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 Yet, despite NATO’s determined efforts to develop an aggressive counterterrorism 
programme, the ultimate effectiveness of these efforts may be overshadowed by lingering, 
institutional  problems facing the alliance.  The first and most serious problem is NATO’s 
present decision making process which requires unanimity178 to take military action.  This 
decision making process is incompatible with NATO’s goal of providing the alliance with 
credible counterterrorism capabilities because success in the counterterrorism context will 
require NATO to enhance its ability to make rapid decisions.179 At its present size of twenty-six 
member nations, NATO’s capacity for rapid decision making is seriously impaired,180 and any 
future expansion will only make unanimity on military decisions more difficult to attain.  Thus, 
NATO's arcane, protracted decision making process will need to be reformed if NATO's 
aggressive counterterrorism programme is to be successful.181 
Another problem which may confront any future deployment of NATO counterterrorism 
forces under the aegis of Article 5 is whether the international community can agree upon a 
 
178 NATO Handbook, Chapter 7:  Policy and Decision Making:  The North Atlantic 
Council, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070101.htm.   
 
179 The United States' war in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates the need for swift 
decision making as well as rapid military deployment capability.  The U.S. military deployed to 
Afghanistan less than a month after September 11, 2001 and was still not quick enough to 
capture Osama bin Laden and other top Al Qaeda leaders.   
 
180 Although NATO was unified with respect to the U.S. led war in Afghanistan, the 
alliance was deeply divided over the United States’ war in Iraq.  See Aaron D. Lindstrom, 
Consensus Decision Making in NATO:  French Unilateralism and the Decision to Defend 
Turkey, 4 U. CHI. J. INT’L L.  579–81 (2003).  In fact, the Iraq war so divided NATO that the 
NAC was unable to act on Turkey's invocation of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.  Id.
181 The Terrorism Defense Concept recommends that NATO develop procedures 
which support “accelerated decision making cycles;” however, NATO has yet to implement this 
proposal.  See supra text accompanying note 135.   
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definition of terrorism.  Presently, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism,182 and, 
although the United Nations General Assembly’s Sixth Committee is currently considering a 
draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that would include a definition of 
terrorism, this convention has yet to be adopted.183 This lack of international consensus on 
defining what actions constitute terrorism has the potential to pose problems for the utilization of 
NATO counterterrorism assets.   If there is an attack, less dramatic and devastating than 
September 11th, on a NATO member nation; it is at least possible that alliance members could 
disagree as to whether that act constitutes terrorism of a kind sufficient to support an invocation 
of Article 5.  If such a situation were to occur, NATO’s cumbersome decision making process 
could again encumber the alliance’s ability to deploy its counterterrorism forces.    
 These potential problems, however, may prove more theoretical than real.  In the 
aftermath of September 11th, NATO was unified in condemning the terrorist attacks and 
supporting the invocation of Article 5.  Since that time, the alliance has consistently and 
frequently reaffirmed its commitment to combat international terrorism.  NATO leaders have 
developed and are in the process of implementing an aggressive, global operations capable 
counterterrorism programme.  Consequently, NATO currently possesses both the legal authority 
and the firepower to become a formidable combatant in the fight against terrorism.  Thus, if 
NATO’s tough anti-terrorism rhetoric is indeed as strong as its resolve to act should the need 
arise, the world will likely witness the stark contrast between the NATO of 2005 and the NATO 
 
182 See United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime:  Definitions of Terrorism at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html. 
 183 United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee:  International 
Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/definition.html.  The proposed definition defines 
terrorism as “any action intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-
combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an 
international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.” Id.
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of 2001.  Where the NATO of 2001 could only provide moral and logistical support to the war 
against terrorism, today’s NATO possesses a more potent counterterrorism arsenal and, more 
importantly, the ability to go on the offensive against terrorism.    
 
